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HENY W. EmuAw

Apygmy

FTER the Napoleonic wars there had been, in a few German
states, isolated and almost insignificant attempts to
t 1
introduce some sort of parliamentary inquiry."1 9 Even a liberalminded professor of southern Germany wrote, in 1830, that the parliament, though entitled to know the truth, could learn the facts only from
the government.' Another writer, having highly praised the right of
parliamentary inquiry as practiced in England, remarked resignedly that
this right could hardly acquire citizenship in the "constitutional" monarchies of Germany.x3'
The political and constitutional storms of the year 1848 gave hope
that in both Germany and Prussia introduction of the investigating
privileges of the British Parliament would be possible. In the National
Assembly in Frankfort a motion was brought forward recommending an
adaptation of the English practice to hear witnesses and experts before
parliamentary committees under oath. The motion was referred to a
standing committee and heard of no more. 32 In a later, rather confused discussion of similar questions before the same assembly, the fear
was voiced that the hearing of witnesses by parliament might trespass dan33
gerously upon the judicial sphere.1
One of the subcommittees of the Constituent National Assembly of
Prussia, meeting during the same period, had, under the influence of the
* Continued from the December, 1943, issue of the Review.

129Often quoted is Art. 91 of the Constitution of Sachsen-Weimar-Eisenach, granted in i8z6
by Goethe's friend, Karl August of Weimar. See, e.g., 2 Lammers, Handbuch des deutschen
Staatsrechts 455 (1932).
X3oVon Rotteck, 2 Lehrbuch des Vernunftrechtes und der Staatswissenschaften 244 (1830).
The author was right. Only after
'3' 3 Zachariae, Vierzig Bficher vom Staate 263 (839).
the collapse of the German monarchies, eighty years later, was a true right of parliamentary
inquiry created. A concise history of the pre-i98 attempts to introduce parliamentary inquiry
is given in Senat in Bremen v, Btirgerschaft in Bremen, Staatsgerichtshof, July I2, 1921. 102
Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 425 et seq. (1921).
132 Session of May 29, 1848. 1 Stenographischer Bericht Uber die Verhandlungen der
deutschen konstituierenden Nationalversammlung z64, 194 (1848). See, also, i Hatschek,
Deutsches und Preussisches Staatsrecht 687 (1930).
133

Session of October 6, 1848, ibid. vol. 4, 2433-4 (1848).
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English constitutional practice, voted the introduction of parliamentary
inquiry. Although the government was opposed because "the government was in a much better position to give the necessary information ....
to the parliament," the assembly favored the new institution because
"the government could be partisan." The first draft had contained the
provision that "the inquiring committees should be entitled to hear
witnesses under oath, with the assistance of judges, and to require the aid
of the administration." After the National Assembly had been dissolved
by King Frederick William IV, Prussia received a constitution by royal
decree. Both this constitution and its successor maintained for the two
houses of parliament the right to keep themselves informed by instituting
"committees for the investigation of facts."' 34 But significantly enough, the
additional provision concerning the gathering of evidence by the com35
mittees was omitted.1
Actually, the Prussian parliament made use of its constitutional right
of inquiry in exactly four cases over a period of seventy years (1848-19).
The first three committees, dealing with economic and educational
questions, gathered their evidence merely from governmental sources,
hearing some experts but no outside witnesses.136 The fourth inquiry,
organized by the lower house in November, 1863, in order to investigate
the brutal intervention by Bismarck's government during the preceding
elections, led to an open clash between parliament and government. The
government was victorious, and a virtual breakdown of the whole institution of parliamentary inquiry followed. The majority of the House, still
unbrokenly liberal in the midst of the "conflict" era, had voted the inquiry in accordance with-Article 82 of the constitution. One representative
had stressed that the governmental policy had hurled the country into
such a "calamity" that only a thorough investigation could regenerate
the nation. The Minister of the Interior,,who had most conspicuously and
134 Article 82. For the complete history of the origins of the provision, see x von Rnne,
Das Staatsrecht der Preussischen Monarchie 290-1 (i88i).
X35von R6nne, supra, note 134, at p. 291, and Zweig, Die parlamentarische Enqu6te nach

deutschem und osterreichischem. Recht, 6 Zeitschrift fur Politik 267, at 285 (1913), maintain
that this provision was omitted for the sole reason that it was self-evident. Actually it is probable that from the very outset the government attempted to give as little investigating power
as possible into the hands of the committees (cf. the attitude of the French Senate above, at
note 49). Lammers, supra, note 129, at p. 45o, rightly calls Art. 82 a lex imperfecta because
neither the constitution nor a subsequent statute provided for enforcement devices.
136See the account given in 3 Sammlung s~mtlicher Drucksachen des Hauses des Abgeordneten aus der VIII Legislatur Period I Session 1863-64, No. 102, pp. 6-7. 1 Bluntschli, Allgemeines Staatsrecht 530 (x868) complained in general that on the Continent the committees
relied almost exclusively on evidence offered officially and neglected the testimony of witnesses
so largely used in England.
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successfully attempted to influence the election results, foresaw for the inquiry committee an unavoidable "conflict with administration and judiciary"; he threatened that the committee, which was organized in opposition
to the government, would "not enjoy the ready cooperation of the
7
government."3
In its reports the committee raised the constitutional issue of the extent
of its investigation powers. It maintained that Article 82 had provided
exemption from the principle of the separation of powers and vested the
inquiry committees with the rights of "authorities" (Behrden). Therefore the committee held itself to be entitled to employ all "legal means of
evidence." The example of England was again cited.X38 The report admitted, however, that as a practical matter the evidence had remained
scanty because of the government's strict order to all branches of the
administration to ignore the requests of the committee.139 As to witnesses,
none but testimony voluntarily.offered could be obtained. Where a witness, generally because of the government's attitude, declared himself
unwilling to testify, the committee was powerless.X4o Also, it could only
complain about the slowness of the majority of the courts to comply with
the request to hear witnesses for the committee.14'
In view of this situation, one of'the committee members asked for the
indictment of the cabinet for violation of the constitutional right of
parliamentary investigation.142 A somewhat milder resolution, merely
blaming the government for its attitude, was adopted by an overwhelming
majority of the house.' 4' Thus the extent of the investigating powers became a crucial issue. But a few hours after the adoption of the resolution,
Bismarck dissolved the Prussian parliament, declaring its behavior harmful to the "power and honor of Prussia."' 44 In that bombastic declaration
was already sounded the fanfare of "necessary military expeditions."
137Session of November 28, z863, I Stenographische Berichte fiber die Verhandlungen 168,
171, 178, i9o (1863-4).
138 1 Bericht der XII Kommission zur Untersuchung der Thatsachen etc., 3 Sammlung
srtmmtlicher Drucksachen des Hauses der Abgeordneten aus der VIII Legislatur Period I Ses-

sion 1863-4, No. 102, pp. 2-3.
139

Ibid. 12-X3, and No. 1o3, p. 2.
No. 103, pp. 33, 36, 37, 39, 41, 62.

X40Ibid.

Z41 Session of January 25, 1864. 2 Stenographische Berichte Uber die Verhandlungen
(1863-4), 941.
X42See i Bericht etc. in 3 Sammlung, etc. No. 102, 15.
'43 See ibid., i8, and session of January 25, 1864, 2 Stenographische Berichte fiber die Verhandlungen 941 (x863-4).
144 Ibid., 943.
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When the series of wars which then started were brought to a successful
conclusion, the liberal opposition committed hara-kiri, and no longer strove
for parliamentary rights. No other parliamentary inquiry was under45
taken in Prussia until the establishment of the republic.
In the constitutions of Imperial Germany and of her predecessor, the
Norddeutscher Bund, the right of inquiry was not mentioned. Twice, in
i868 and in 189 o , an unsuccessful attempt was made by Social Democrats 46 to introduce it. During the discussion of the first proposal, in
r868,14 7 one (liberal) representative declared the entire right of inquiry
was not worth as much as was generally believed. Another pointed to the
poor results in Prussia, for which he saw the reason, rightly, in the impossibility of compelling the testimony of private individuals and civil
servants. To give the committee powers so extensive as those granted in
England would certainly, he thought, meet with the resistance of the
Federal Council and the government. And indeed the latter had asked for
the rejection of the proposed amendment to the constitution; the majority
of the House acted accordingly.
The bill introduced in 1890148 emphasized the necessity of giving to the
investigating committees the power to compel sworn testimony. In the
discussion Bebel declared that without such powers the task of discovering the truth could not be fulfilled. The government once again opposed
the bill as an attempt to vest in the parliament functions entrusted to the
executive.'49
From these discussions it became evident that in Germany the right of
political inquiry could not develop, as in France, without any statutory
basis. The only half-developed parliamentarism in Prussia and Germany
gave this right no more recognition than the vote of confidence enjoyed.
145Purely theoretical discussions about the extent and the powers of parliamentary investigations continued unabated. See von R6nne, supra, note 134, at p. 291-97. Even "in theory"
it was admitted that the committees had no power to obtain evidence which was not voluntarily given. See Anschtitz, Deutsches Staatsrecht, in 4 Enzyklopaedie der Rechtswissenschaft.

Rohler 145 (1914).
146 It is worth noting that in both France (see note 45 supra) and Germany the leaders of
the Socialist opposition in the parliaments intervened on behalf of larger investigating powers.
The explanation lies certainly in the fact that in both countries the parliamentary inquiry was
an expression of distrust of the administration. Hence the eagerness of the opposition parties
to secure effective means of investigation.
147 Session of June 5, i868. i Stenograpische Berichte fiber die Verhandlungen des Norddeutschen Bundes. i Legislatur Periode 258-267 (1568).
148 Stenographische Berichte fdber die Verhandlungen des Reichstags. 8 Legislatur Periode i.
Session, Anlageband 237 (189o).
149

Session of December 9, i89 i , ibid., Vol. 5, 3288,

3292.
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Moreover, public opinion did not clamor for parliamentary investigation;
its value was recognized by only a few.150
Max Weber, in his criticism of the political situation in Imperial Germany, attributed greater responsibility for the' unsatisfactory results of

constitutional life to the lack of parliamentary investigation than to any
other single factor. The German parliament, he wrote, unable as it was

to hear witnesses under oath on the facts, "independently of the good will
of the administration," was condemned to "dilettantism as well as ig5
norance'-,
1s

It was more consonant with the actual distribution of power in Germany
and the German states that, when the need for an investigation made
itself felt, the government instituted inquiry committees by decree,
whether on its own initiative or on the motion of the Reichstag.S2 While
parliamentarians sometimes sat on the committees, they were always in
a minority. Other investigations were carried out by boards without any
parliamentary ties. 5s Accordingly, the evidence examined by those imperial or royal committees was sifted by the authorities, and not by the
parliament. Thus the investigations had none of the characteristics of a
truly parlimentary inquiry and were but "the product of executive discretion.' 5s4 In view of the kind of evidence gathered by them, the question
,so "It must be admitted," says Neumann-Hofer, Die Wirksamkeit der Kommissionen in
den Parlamenten, 4 Zeitschrift ffir Politik 5I, at p. 72 (I911), "that a request [for the right
of inquiry] had not often, and never urgently, been made."
1s' Weber, Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland 57-8 (1918; written
19'7).
's2 A number of them are retrospectively mentioned by Heck, Das parlamentarische Untersuchungsrecht at p. 9-12 (1925) and by Jacobi, 2 Verhandlungen des vierunddreissigsten
deutschen Juristentags (1926) (quoted hereafter 34, 2 J.T.) 85. These inquiries and their
methods are treated in more detail by Morstein-Marx, Commissions of Inquiry in Germany,
30 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1134 (z936), by Zahn, article on Wirtschaftsenquete in Handw6rterbuch
der Staatswissenschaften, 4th ed. ErgYnzungsband io9 et seq. (1929), and by Rosenbaum,
Zur Methode von Enqueten, ii Wirtschaftsdienst 949 et seq. (1926) and Deutsche Enqu6ten,
ibid. 1023 et seq.
1s3 Typical was the situation in Prussia, when a representative, Lasker, asked for a parliamentary investigation into the railroad concessions (see 2 Anlagen zu den Stenographischen
Berichten fiber die Verhandlungen des Hauses der Abgeordneten, ii Legislatur Periode 750
(1872/3). Before the debate was opened, a royal message, signed, among others, by the very
minister whose activity was to be investigated, established a special commission, in which the
representatives of the government had the majority. See ibid. 867. Before withdrawing his
motion, Lasker showed the difference existing between a parliamentary inquiry and an investigation by the royal commission. See 2 Stenographische Berichte Uber die Verhandhungen des

Hauses der Abgeordneten, ii Legislatur Periode 1043-50, 1059 (1872/3).
154Morstein-Marx, supra, note 152, at p. 114o. An interesting view of the proceedings of one
of the most outstanding of these inquiries is given by Weber, Die Ergebnisse der deutschen
BMrsenenquete, 43 Zeitschrift ffir das Gesamte Handelsrecht 83 et seq. (1895).
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how far their investigative powers extended would hardly arise. 5 5 It was
at all times admitted that the committees did not have any power to coms6

pel testimony.z

The constitution of the German Republic granted the right of inquiry
to the Reichstag. Article 34 reads, in its most important parts, 57 "The
Reichstag has the right, and on proposal of one-fifth of its members the
duty, to appoint investigating committees. These committees, in public
sittings, shall inquire into the evidence which they or the proponents deem
necessary. The public can be excluded by a two-thirds majority vote of
the investigating committee ..... The courts and administrative authorities are required to comply with requests by these committees for
information, and the records of the authorities shall on request be submitted to them. The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall
apply (as far as they are appropriate) to the inquiries of those committees
and of the authorities assisting them, but the secrecy of letters and other
mail, telegraph and telephone services shall remain inviolate." In imitation of this institution, most of the German states adopted similar
provisions in the new state constitutions.5 8
The introduction of the right of inquiry into the constitution of Weimar
was due to the direct influence of Max Weber. 5 9 He had earlier praised the
'55 Embden, Wie sind Enqu~ten zu organisieren? in Das Verfahren bei Enquaten fiber sociale Verhoiltnisse 12 (1877), identifies rightly the "Beamtenstaat" with what he calls the "incomplete inquiry" and modem parliamentarism with the complete inquiry. The delimitation
of both types corresponds to the distinction made in the text. Embden admits that in the Germany of his day only "incomplete inquiries," i.e., investigations without investigating power,
were tolerated.
zS6 Neumann-Hofer, supra, note i5o, at p. 73, called this impossibility an "irreparable handicap" for the German commissions when compared with the British. On the occasion of the investigation into the cartels, it was proposed to enact special laws giving to the inquiry committees the power to compel testimony, in imitation of English and American practices. The
proposal was rejected. See Reichsamt des Innem, z Denkschrift tiber das Kartellwesen. Drucksachen des Reichstags No. 4, 6 (i9o6).
'57

Translation adapted from Mattem, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the German

National Republic

429-30 (1928).

s58See, e.g., Art. 25 of the Prussian, Art. 52 of the Bavarian, Art. 2z of the Saxon, Art. 8 of

the Wiirttembergian, constitutions.
'S9 The part which Weber actually played in the history of the article is interestingly told,
with the use of private correspondence and unpublished drafts of the constitution, by Heck,
supra, note 152, at p. 13-14. It was equally due to Weber's influence that the parliamentary
investigation in Germany also had the function of protecting the minority of the parliament:
one-fifth of the members could request the investigation(see Weber, supra, note i51 at p. 67).
This particular feature cannot be discussed here. About its (perhaps more theoretical than
practical) importance, see Morstein-Marx, Beitridge zum Problem des parlamentarischen
Minderheitenschutzes, 12 Abhandlungen und Mitteilungen aus dem Seminar fur 6ffentliches
Recht (1924); he calls (p. 33) Art. 34 the "most significant purgatory of political morals known
to the constitution." Similarly Lewald, Enquaterecht und Aufsichtsrecht, 5 Archiv des bffent-
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right of inquiry as yielding the "very best results of the English Parliament," and had recommended its introduction in Germany as the "fundamental pre-condition of all further reforms."' 6 °
The question of investigating powers was treated first in a committee
of the Constitutional National Assembly almost casually. The representative of the Department of justice drew attention to the necessity of
compelling testimony under oath. As between the two ways to achieve
this-either a detailed regulation in the standing order of the Reichstag,
or an application of the Code of Criminal Procedure-he declared himself
in favor of the first. Nevertheless the committee members decided for
the application of the Code as far as appropriate. 6' Max Weber had remarked in his previous private draft that since parliamentary inquiry
involved the public interest even more than did penal procedure, all
powers of enforcement should be given to the investigating committees.
He therefore recommended at least a complete, not only an "appropriate,"
application of the Code of Penal Procedure.' 62 The plenary session of the
Assembly adopted the provision concerning parliamentary inquiry, probrealizing its importance, without discussion, almost unably without
wittingly.111 3
During the years of the Weimar Republic, the Reichstag and, among
the German states, particularly the parliament of Prussia, frequently
made use of the right of inquiry.16 4 In the two cases in which the newlylichen Rechts, N.F. 326 (1923); at 320 he connects the protection of the minority with the
general function of the inquiry: the discovery of the truth is furthered in situations where a
parliamentary majority would prefer to leave facts undiscovered.
x6o Weber, supra, note 151 at p. 59-6o.
X61
336 Verhandlungen der verfassungsgebenden Deutschen Nationalversammiung. Anlagen zu den stenographischen Berichten No. 39r. Bericht des Verfassungsauschusses 266. In
some of the state constitutions (see the list in Lammers, supra, note 129, at p. 470) there is no
reference to the provisions of the Code of Penal Procedure. The committees of those states
were therefore unable to enforce their decisions on testimony, etc.
x62See Heck, supra, note 152, at p. 57. Weber's opinion is diametrically opposed to that of
Michon, Des Enquites parlementaires (i8go), wh6 at p. 61 expresses opposition to any compulsory power of the committees because "the social interest" involved in parliamentary inquiry is less great than in the repression of delinquency.
x63Session of July 3, I919, 327 Verhandlungen der verfassungsgebenden Deutschen Nationalversammlung 1264 B, 1291 B.

x64 The most important inquiries of the Reichstag are listed and discussed briefly by
Poetzsch-Heffter, Vom Staatsleben unter der Weimarer Verfassung, 13 Jahrbuch des 6ffentlichen Rechts 121--23 (1925); 17 ibid. 75-6 (1929). See also Kdttgen, Die Entwicklung des

6ffentlichen Rechts in Preussen, 18 ibid. i9(i93o), and von Jan, Verfassung und Verwaltung in
Bayern, i5 ibid. 4 (1927), and ig ibid. 7 (1931). I am very much indebted for valuable remarks on the practice of parliamentary investigation in republican Germany to Professor Hans
Staudinger, formerly Staatssekretar in German ministries, now Dean of the Graduate Faculty
of Political and Social Science of the New School for Social Research, New York City, and to
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created Constitutional Court (Staatsgerichtshof) had to decide on the
issue of parliamentary inquiry, it attempted to narrow down its scope
considerably.76 s However, the institution as such could no longer be
eliminated, 66 and continued to be practiced until the end of the Republic
in 1933."
Unlike the situation prevailing in France, in Germany Article 34
seemed to have given a'statutory delimitation of investigating powers.
From the very beginning, however, sharp controversies arose concerning
the extent of the powers of committees over persons and papers, the
uncertitude being favored both by the somewhat vague wording of Article
34 and by the particular circumstances of the first parliamentary inquiry
under the new regime.
The National Assembly in Weimar had decided to place the investigations concerning the responsibility of the German imperial authorities
for the World War and its prolongation in the hands of a parliamentary
inquiry commission, such as was provided for in Article 346" In spite of
Dr. Ernst Hamburger, former member of the Prussian Landtag, now Research Associate of
the same faculty.
6
1 S See the decision mentioned above at note 131, and Fraktion der Bfirgerpartei und des
Bauernbundes im wiirttembergischen Landtag v. (i) den wiirttenbergischen Landtag, vertreten durch seinen Pr'sidenten, (2) den Freistaat Wiirttemberg, vertreten durch seinen Staatsprasidenten, Staatsgerichtshof January 12, 1922. io4 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in
Zivilsachen 423 et seq. (1922). In this second case it is asserted that even after 19x9 the
parliamentary inquiry in Germany and her states could not have the broad functions held"
in Great Britain. Lengthy excerpts from the two decisions in English translation are given by
Mattern, supra, note 157, at p. 285 et seq. A sharp criticism of the decisions is voiced by
Poetzsch-Heffter, Zwei Urteile des Staatsgerichtshof -iberUntersuchungsausschiisse, 4 Archiv.
des Wffentlichen Rechts N.F. 210-38 (1922), and by Lewald, supra, note i59 at p. 978.
x66 See Alsberg, 34. 1 J. T. 335 (1926). For the fact that parliamentary investigations actually never became a "significant feature of Weimar democracy," see infra, note 272.
X67We omit from the following discussion the investigations carried out by the so-called socialization committees in 1919 and 1920 (Reichsgesetzblatt-i919-i98 and ibid.- 9 20- 9 81;
see also Rosenbaum, supra, note 152, at p. 1026) and by the commission of inquiry which
proposed in 1926 to survey the possibilities of economic recovery (Reichsgesetzblatt (1926)
I95-6; see also Rosenbaum, Die Enqu6te von 1926, ii Wirtschaftsdienst 1053 ff. (1926), and
Morstein-Marx, supra, note 152, at p. 1142-3). Not only from the constitutional aspect was
neither of these commissions a parliamentary investigating committee, the one being designated as a "free scientific body," the other as an "organ of the national government with a
privileged status." Likewise the composition of these commissions, as well as their methods of
discovering the facts, and the legal basis for their investigating powers, differed so greatly
from ordinary parlimentary committees that they cannot be treated here. The extremely
meager results of these and some similarly organized economic committees were notorious.
This was due, of course, much more to the historical circumstances than to the extent of the
investigating powers of the committees. See also Hartnig, Darstellung des Enqu~teverfahrens
27-55 (1931)z68Session of August 20, 1919, 329 Verhandlungen der Verfassungsgebenden Nationalversaminmlung 27o8 A. For more details, see W. Jellinek, Revolution und Reichsverfassung, 9
Jahrbuch fUr Wffentiiches Recht 89 et seq. (1920).
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assertions to the contrary, 6 9 there could be no doubt that the committee

was constitutional; nothing inArticle 34 forbade the opening of such
an investigation. Another question was whether a parliamentary committee was particularly fitted to pass judgment on events of world history
where not only the mistakes of a government and its agents but an entire
regime, its foundations and basic beliefs, had to be judged. 7° Undoubtedly, for political as well as legal reasons,' 7 ' it must be considered a stroke
of bad luck that the young right of inquiry in Germany was subjected
at its very birth to the strain of the so-called War Guilt Committee.' 72
The difficulties started as soon as the committee began to gather evidence
by hearing political and military leaders of Imperial Germany. All of
them took the oath according to the German Code of Criminal Procedure,
73
which, with certain exceptions, declares the oath of witnesses obligatory.
But some of them did so under violent protestations against the fact that
sworn testimony was asked of persons who could be indicted the very next
day on the same facts. 7 4 One witness after another protested against the
"illegal combination of defendant and witness in the same person ....
the abnormality contrary to the legal conceptions of all civilized nations."'' When General Ludendorff, during a committee hearing, read a
169See, e.g., Kaufmann, Untersuchungsausschuss und Straatsgerichtshof 22 (1920); Finger,
Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches der Verfassung v. ii Aug. I919 261 (1923).
170 Characteristically enough, Max Weber, the staunchest advocate of the right of inquiry,
advised strongly against entrusting the question of war guilt to a parliamentary investigation.
See his letter to the Frankfurter Zeitung of March 20, i9i9, published in Gesammelte Politische
Schriften 487 (1921). An analogous investigation was conducted by the committee instituted
in France in 1871 to pass judgment on the responsibility of the French Government of National
Defense (see especially the "Note" of this inquiry committee, Session of November 13, 1872;
Annexe No. 1416 J. 0. 251-258 (1876)). The results of both the German and the French committees were equally poor, not only because the subject of their investigations was not suited
to parliamentary inquiry, but also because their investigating powers were inadequate to their
tasks (see Arnitz, Les Enqu6tes parlementaires d'ordre politique 92 (1917), and Vossische
Zeitung, February i, 1926). '7' The hearing of the imperial generals Hindenburg and Ludendorif was an occasion for the
staging of reactionary mass demonstrations (see Vossische Zeitung, November 14, 19ig).
17 Only a few months after the enactment of the Constitution, the institution of parliamentary inquiry committees was already (in a Reichstag debate) under the fire of arguments
springing from the unsatisfactory results of the War Guilt Committee. See session of October
24, 1919, 330 Verhandlg. etc. 3395 D.
x73
Articles 57, 58, and 61.
174At the time of the committee's investigations there was actually a proposal under discussion to try the members of the Imperial Government before a special high court. See Kaufmann, supra, note i69, at p. 29 et seq., and Kahl, Untersuchungsausschuss und Staatsgerichtshof, 25 Deutsche Juristen Zeitung i et seq. (1920).
17s 1 Stenographische Berichte fiber die 6ffentlichen Verhandlungen des i5Untersuchungsausschusses der Verfassungsgebenden Nationalversammlung 301, 313, 478; 2 ibid. 695-6.
One of the committee members rightly emphasized (oc. cit. vol. 1, 479-8) that such a situation was not infrequent in parliamentary inquiries in other countries.
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juridical dissertation expounding why, according to Article 54 (now
Article 55) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he and Hindenburg would
be entitled to refuse any testimony,' 76 and when he asserted that by taking
the witness stand they volunteered their services for the discovery of the
truth,77 it became evident that a concerted manoeuvre was intended to
challenge the committee. The committee was unable to meet this challenge, and was helpless when the same witnesses indulged in lengthy
propaganda speeches against republican government and institutions. In
Germany the institution of contempt of court is as unknown as it is in
France.'15 Some of the most elementary rights of the tribunals to maintain order are scattered throughout various laws. As none of them is
contained in the Code of Penal Procedure, to which alone Article 34 of the
constitution referred, the chairman of the committee could only protest
in vain against the witnesses who proceeded "according to plan." After
the first hearing of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, the committee suspended
its sessions for several months, although the evidence was by no means
complete. It then decided to refrain from obtaining oral testimony because it had no other means of preventing the transformation of the committee's investigation into what its chairman, after the experience with
the Kaiser's generals, called a "political debating club.' '. 79 Weber had
expectedS ° that the parliamentary right of inquiry would terminate a
situation in which the members of parliament very often could obtain
only cynical and arrogant answers from acting government officials. A
few months after the enactment of the new constitution, a parliamentary
committee to which insufficient powers had been given was helpless
x76 Article 55 of the Code permits a witness to refuse to give testimony which could cause
his criminal prosecution or that of his close relatives.
177 Berichte, supra, note 175, vol. 2, 696-7. The opinion of the witnesses was shared by
Hachenburg, Juristische Rundschau, in 24 Deutsche Juristen Zeitung 987 (199); Otker,
Untersuchung durch einen Reichstagsausschuss wihrend schwebenden Strafverfahrens, 9z
Der Gerichtssaal 433 ('925); Kaufmann, supra, note i69, atp.. 29, and Kahl, supra, note x74,
at p. iet seq.
178 This was considered by a German student of Congressional investigation as the most
serious handicap for the inquiries organized by the parliaments of Republican Germany. See
B6hmert, Die Straf- und Zwangsbefugnisse der nordamerikanischen gesetzgebenden Versammlungeu und ihrer Untersuchungsausschiisse 4 (1927). On the significant difference which
prevails in common law and in civil law countries in regard to contempt powers in general, see
Pekelis, Legal Techniques and Political Ideologies, A Comparative Study, 41 Mich. L. Rev.
665 (i943), Pekelis, Administrative Discretion and the Rule of Law, io Social Research 33
(1943), and Krassa, Interaction of Common Law and Latin Law: Enforcement of Specific
Performance in Louisiana and Quebec, 21 Canadian Bar Rev. 337 (1943).
179See 2 Verhandlungen, etc. 699, 700, 701, 705, 714, 759; and Vossische Zeitung, November
x8, 19ig.
x6o
Supra, note x5i, at p. 58.
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against the provocative behavior of the military and political leaders of a
defunct regime.
During one of the sessions the former secretary of state, Helfferich,
refused to answer a relatively unimportant question asked him by one of
the committee members, Representative Cohn of the Independent
Socialist Party. Mr. Helfferich motivated his refusal by the fact that Mr.
Cohn had repeatedly declared that he looked upon the witness as a defendant. Moreover, Mr. Helfferich asserted that had this been a court
proceeding, he would consider Mr. Cohn disqualified as a judge because
of his political activities. Applying Article 69 (now Article 70)8! of the
Code of Penal Procedure, the committee assessed a fine of 3oo semi-inflated marks. The same witness later persisted in his attitude, specifying
that he would answer every question of the chairman, but none put by
Mr. Cohn. The committee assessed the fine for a second time, but subsequently had to cancel it because Article 7o-IV of the Code prohibits
repeated assessments of fines 112 However, even when the committee
turned to the courts for the collection of the first fine, the higher courts
sustained the witness's contention that the decree assessing the fine was
illegal and hence could not be served nor the fine collected. 8 3 It is true

that the behavior, outrageously disorderly, of the witness Helfferich during the incident would have been reason enough for several punishments
for contempt, if only the committee had had any contempt power.
xIsArticle 5x provides, as to the witness who does not appear, a fine (ranging, before 1924,
from i to 300 marks, since then, from i to i,ooo RM), or in case of non-payment, imprisonment up to six weeks. The witness can also be apprehended in order to secure his appearance.
Article 70 provides, as to the witness who refuses to testify, a fine of equal amount, or imprisomnent up to six months.
182 See i Verhandlungen, etc. 59o-6o
67o-673, 693-4; and Vossische Zeitung, November 13,
i919.
1S3 See Kammergericht Zivil Senat i A, March ig, 1920, 40 Rechtsprechung der Oberlandesgerichte auf dem Gebiet des Zivilrechts 172 (1920); Vossische Zeitung, December 23,
i919, and February 8, 1920. It seemed actually doubtful whether the committee had

rightfully applied Article 7o. This provision is a weapon against the witness who refuses
to contribute to the discovery of the truth; Heliferich had not refused to answer any question which the chairman would put to him. The whole situation, and even the various court
decisions, were extremely involved. See also Heck, supra, note I52, at p. 7o, and Siehr, Zur
Frage der Zeugnisverweigerung vor dem Untersuchungsausschuss, 6 Deutsche Strafrechtszeitung 373-75 (i919). Binding, in Leipziger Neuste Nachrichten, January 6, 192o, and Kauf-

mann, supra, note i69, at p. 3i, thought that the application of Article 7o by a parliamentary
committee would never be "appropriate" in the sense of Article 34 of the constitution. If this
suggestion, refuted by Hatschek, supra, note 132, at p. 7o, had been followed, the inquiry

committees would have been deprived of any effective means of furthering the discovery of the
truth. This argumentation shows not only to what interpretation the vague wording of
Article 34 easily lent itself, but, more important, that attempts to deny investigating powers
to the parliament did not cease with the enactment of the republican constitution. Messrs.
Binding and Kaufmann taught, respectively, penal and constitutional law at the leading
German universities of Leipzig and Berlin.
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In spite of this early setback, the investigating powers over witnesses
granted by the constitution to the inquiry committees did not always
prove equally unsuccessful for the discovery of the truth. In general the
sharp antagonisms and the great number of parties under the Weimar
Republic made for a painstaking investigation at least of those facts which
in the opinion of one committee member could be detrimental to his
political adversary. 18 4
That the committees had no contempt power to punish witnesses for
disorderly behavior was authoritatively stated after many more controversies had arisen. 5s This situation frequently led to conflicts between
committees and witnesses hardly reconcilable with the dignity of parliament.

86

But no statute was ever enacted to supplement the insufficient

powers of parliament, the only bill introduced in the Reichstag dealing
with the right of inquiry aimed at a substantial curtailment, not enlargement, of the committees' powers.187
On the other hand, it was no longer denied that under Articles 51 and
70 of the Code of Penal Procedure the committees had the right to demand
punishment of witnesses who failed to appear or refused to testify. To obtain such punishment, the committees still had to apply to the courts, but
since courts and prosecuting authorities were now deemed obliged to
comply with their requests,8 8 no further difficulties seem to have arisen.
It appears, however, that in not a single case was the imprisonment of recalcitrant witnesses resorted to, although the law would have entitled the
committees to use this means of coercion.
184 Characteristically enough, in those German states where the antagonisms between extremist parties developed earliest, the parliamentary inquiry was most frequently sought in
order to compromise the political adversary. (See, for Thuringia, K6llreutter, Parlament und
Verwaltung, 3x Deutsche juristen Zeitung 257 (1926)). The esprit de corps among parliamentarians which very often prevailed in France-perhaps with the exception of the extreme
left--did not develop in the short-lived German Republic.
18sSee the Gutachliche Ausserung [by the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of
Justice] fiber die Zwangs- und Strafbefugnisse der parlamentarischenUntersuchungsausschisse.
Verhandlungen des Reichstags. Ill. Wahlperiode (1924) Anlage zu den Stenographischen
Berichten No. 269o, p. 2. The argument was still that Article 34 of the constitution did not
mention the statute containing the contempt powers. Heck, supra, note J52, had rightly
maintained that the "appropriate" application of the Code of Penal Procedure included the
application of the supplementary provisions of a statute which was only technically different.
The authoritative interpretation decided otherwise.
z86 See Hachenburg, Juristische Rundschau, 31 Deutsche juristen Zeitung 498 (1926).
While no punishment of contumacious witnesses was possible, the police power of parliament
was once used to expel a member of the committee from the sitting. See Drucksachen des
Preussischen Landtags No. 58, Sp. 8o (1925).
187 See infra, note 290.
X88See the Gutachliche Ausserung, supra, note i85, and, similarly, Lucas, Die Strafgewalt
parlamentarischer Untersuchungsausschfisse, 2 Juristische Rundschau 336 et seq. (x926);
Anschfitz, Die Veffassung des Deutschen Reichs vom ir August 1919 139 (1926).
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Whereas the Code of Penal Procedure prescribes the compulsory oath
for witnesses to be taken before testimony is given, the parliamentary
committees very often refrained completely from imposing the oath, or at
least deferred it until after the completion of testimony. 89 In certain
investigations of the Prussian parliament, it became even the general
practice to forego the oath.1 90 The hesitation at imposing the oath usually
originated in the scruple to have the oath taken by a witness who could,
possibly on the same facts, be the defendant in criminal proceedings.
TJaere also prevailed an uncertainty as to whether a witness threatened
by criminal prosecution could refuse to answer altogether.191
The largely varying practices resulting from such a situation were certainly not favorable to an effective discovery of the truth. While one
investigating committee decided that the witness could not refuse to
answer any question, its chairman spoke out, saying that he considered
such a procedure "torture.11192 A member of another committee declared

that failure to have witnesses swear to their statements meant that the
committee would be confronted with the "most terrible lies."'' 93 One
might wonder whether the very numerous committees which almost never
imposed the oath did not have to reckon with the untruthfulness of
testimony.

Repeatedly it was maintained that a law laying.down uniform and precise rules for the extent of investigating powers should be enacted, 94 but
the proposals never reached even the state of a bill."g9

X89
See, for a discussion of the questions involved, the debate in the session of February 3,
!925, on the so-called Staatsbankausschuss. i Drucksachen des Preuss. Landtags, 2 Wahlper-

iode 1925 No.

319, 434; and session of May 7, 1925, 2 ibid. No. 58o, 1379-81.

e.g., the investigation into the so-called Vehm murders, 9ibid. No. 3345,88o.
191That there was a duty to testify in such cases was maintained by Rosenberg, Parlamentarische und gerichtliche Untersuchungen, 3o Deutsche Juristen Zeitung 637 (1925); the
opposite conclusion was drawn by Warmuth, Staatsgerichtshof und parlamentarischer Untersuchungsausschuss 35 (i929); Lammers, supra, note 129, at p. 471; Hatschek, supra, note 132,
at p. 703; Finger, supra, note 16g, at p. 262. For similar difficulties arising in France, see supra
at notes 87 and 88.
IgoSee,

1922 Drucksachen des Preuss. Landtags, 2 Wahlperiode 1925, No. 580, 1379; No. 58o, pp.

3-1531. Against the decision of the committee also Herz, Auskunftspersonen vor den Untersuchungsausschiissen, Vossische Zeitung, March z8, r926.
X93
See Leidig, 34.2 J. T. z3i.
194See Heck, supra, note 152, at p. 83; Jacobi, 34.2 J.T. 97 (1926). The dangers arising
from the formlessness of the proceedings before the committees for the discovery of the truth
are depicted by Chrzescinski, Untersuchungsausschiisse, 3o Deutsche Juristen Zeitung 1078
(1925).

195 In view of the foregoing, the unsubstantiated statement made by Blachly-Oatman, The
Government and Administration of Germany 633 (1928), that the German committees had
rather broad inquisitorial powers and that witnesses were "not so thoroughly immune from
effective inquisition as is sometimes the case in the United States," appears erroneous.
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The limits of every investigative power in a political situation like that
prevailing in the Weimar Republic were demonstrated by the behavior of
some witnesses during the investigation into the so-called Vehm murders.
They declared before the committee that they would not hesitate to swear
to a false statement before a despised parliamentary institution if that was
necessary for the weal of their organizatibns-the right-wing conspiratorial
96
clubs to which they had avowed loyalty.
II. SxAIcH, SEIzuRx, AND ARRsT
Sometimes the uncovering of particularly elusive information might not
be possible by the hearing of witnesses alone.. In cases where the courts
would resort to seizure, search, or arrest for the securing of evidence, are
parliamentary commissions entitled to use similar means? In both France
and Germany this question was of particularly great importance because
no general contempt powers could be exercised to "send for papers."
In France, search and seizure have been practiced by two of the committees characterized above as having been born out of an emergency
situation. 97 The committee of the Chamber of Deputies which investigated the activities of Charles X's ministers obtained, not without
difficulty, all the rights of which the juge d'instruction 98 was possessed.
The majority of the deputies voted for the granting of such powers because the committee had to fulfil a special task very similar to that of
the juge d'instruction: its investigations were destined to prepare the
accusation of the ministers to be judged by the upper house. 99 In its report, the committee related the rather modest use it had made of the rights
obtained by it.20 Somewhat freer use of the right to seize papers and
search for evidence was made by the committee of the Constituent Assembly investigating the insurrection of June, 1848. It is true that the
x96 The episode is related by Schetter, 34.2 J.T. 140 (1926). Since the Weimar Constitution
had constituted the investigating committees "authorities" (see Anschiftz, supra, note 188, at
P- 139) the witnesses faced indictment for perjury. But under the aspect of truth discovery,
it was decisive that the witnesses were not deterred by such a possibility. They either relied
on the usually favorable bias of the courts toward defendants belonging to right-wing organizations, or were willing to take the risk of their loyalty to groups hostile to the existing state.
For the problem of conflicting loyalties in the modem state, see Barker, Reflections on Government 22 (1942).
197See above, at notes

i8 and 79.

19s The functions of the juge d'instruction correspond, in this stage of criminal proceedings,

by and lar ge, to those of the district attorney in the United States.
'99

Article 55 of the Constitutional Charter, Session of August 20, 1830, Moniteur Universel

937 (1830).

200 Session of September 23, i83o, ibid. 1147 et seq.
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committee, in order to obtain such evidence, had co6pted a judge charged
20
to execute the necessary measures. 1

Besides these two extraordinary inquiries, in only one case did a
parliamentary committee order the seizure of evidence. When the first
Panama Committee wished to examine twenty-six checks which the
courts had refused to seize, the committee induced the police to proceed
with an administrative seizure provided for by Article io of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.2°2 Such a situation, however, did not repeat itself.
Not only was the legality of the granting of these competences denied by
writers on constitutional law,20 3 but whenever a request was made to
secure to a committee all investigating powers necessary for the dis-

covery of the truth, it was decried as the most dangerous infringement of
separation of powers as well as of the liberty of the citizen. ° To defeat
the bill proposed by the Chamber in 1914 to include such rights, a Senator
asserted that the enactment of this law would bring back the worst days of
French history and would threaten the security and freedom of every
0

citizen.2°s No better fate was reserved to later attempts which were

made to supplement the statute of 1914 by granting these rights.20° During one of these discussions, a deputy showed how fallacious it was to inyoke Montesquieu constantly: he, who had always declared that virtue
is of the first importance in a state, could not be appealed to for support
by those who wanted to deny the necessary powers for the uncovering of
public scandals.207
20,Session of August 3, i848, 2 Compte Rendu des S6ances de lAssembl6e Nationale 844;
and August 25, 1848, 3 ibid. 467. For a letter of the attorney general on this occasion, see
Pierre, Trait6 de droit politique, 6lectoral et parlementaire 706 (5th ed. i9g9).
2 See Pierre, supra, note 20, at p. 7o6.

°See
3
Michon, supra, note 162, at p. 61, who speaks of "monstrous" rights. Similarly
Arnitz, supra, note i7o, at p. iso; Coustis de la Rivi~re, Les Commissions parlementaires d'enquete et la separation des pouvoirs 9I (1926). Even Bonnard, Les Pouvoirs judiciaires des
du 23 mars 1914, 31 Revue du Droit Public 386,
commissions d'enqu~te parlementaire et la loi
at p. 407 (1914), who, differing with Coustis de la Riviare, considered the statute of 19r4 ac-

ceptable, thought that an enlargement of the powers of investigation beyond that statute
would be unconstitutional because of violation of the separation of powers.
04See, e.g., for the first Panama inquiry, the sessions of December 5 and iS, 1892, J. 0.
D6bats Ch. 1753 and 1817 (1892); for the first Rochette inquiry, the session of July ii, Igo,
ibid. 2499 (1910).
Session of March 20, 1914, J. 0. D~bats S6n. 448 (19r4).
20s

2o6The

Socialist Renaudel remarked during the inquiry into the Oustric scandal that the

statute of 19r4 was not sufficient to shed the necessary light on the facts investigated. The
right-wing politician Mandel then proposed to put the case before the Chamber. See Le
Temps, January 7, 1931.

o7See Lagrange, in the session of February 16,

1934, J. 0. D6bats

Ch. 495

(1934).
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In Germany it was extremely controversial whether the application of
the provisions of the Code of Penal Procedure to parliamentary inquiry
included such rights as searchs seizure, and arrest.2o 8 From the wording
of Article 34 of the constitution one would have gathered rather that it
was originally intended to grant these competences. Otherwise, the explicit provision that the secrecy of mail, telegraph, and telephone services
remain inviolate would have been unnecessary. The controversies about
the correct interpretation of Article 34, however, remained altogether on
a purely theoretical plane. The inquiry committees in Germany never
resorted to search and seizure, and the issue thus was never raised.20 9 The
committee on the war guilt question had published an appeal to deliver
all papers, records, and documents which could be of interest for the
questions investigated21 It had refrained from indicating the powers it
would use to take possession of such evidence, and actually never used
any.
There are numerous parliamentary precedents which show that at all
times Congressional committees searched for evidence in books, records,
and files by the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum.2 1 ' It has never been
doubted that Congress or its committees had the right to do so. It was
also settled relatively early that no secrecy of telegraphic.and mail communications prevailed against the desire to discover the truth, and this
even if state law made telegraphic messages confidential. In 1876-77 an
investigation into election practices in the Southern states caused the
sergeant-at-arms to arrest the manager of the Western Union Telegraph
Company in New Orleans and keep him in custody until he agreed to
produce all telegrams sent or received by eight individuals during a
certain period.212
The only controversial question in regard to documentary evidence was
the extent to which the designation of desired documents had to be
precise. Congress and its committees never saw a necessity to be specific
where they had no knowledge of the peculiar nature of the papers held by
208The question was answered in the affirmative by Hatschek, supra, note 132, at p. 697.
Poetzsch-Heffter, supra, note 164, at p. 183, would grant the right to seize and search, but not
to arrest. Against the granting of arrest as well as seizure and search, Lammers, supra, note
129, atp. 472; Anschtitz, supra, note x88, atp. x4l; Alsberg, 34.1 J. T. 342.
209 See Alsberg, 34.1 J. T. 342.
210

See Heck, supra, note 152, at p. 64.

2- To treat the subpoena duces tecum together with search and seizure is justified by the fact
that in France and Germany the effect obtained by the common law subpoena could often be
realized only by search and seizure.
212 See 4 4th Cong. 2d sess., Record 325, 328-330, 352, 358.
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a witness.213 When, on one occasion, the wholesale demand of a com-

mittee for "papers," especially telegrams, was denounced, a member of the
investigating committee replied, "The reason why we had to go pretty
broadly in our selection was that the corrupt rascals engaged in this
nefarious business used all manner of feigned names ..... Every government on earth has always held for itself the right to examine papers for its
own protection. '' 214 Nor did the House consider itself bound by rules which
apply in the courts between parties litigant as to the production of private
papers, their pertinency and relevancy. "To maintain that ....would

so hamper the power of investigation which this House possesses with
reference to matters of public concernment as to render it almost nugatory.")2LS

It had always been at least the prevailing opinion in Congress that the
Fourth Amendment, preserving the citizen against unreasonable searches
and seizures, did not protect against even the most broadly worded request
of Congress for papers and records..20 The issue was raised once more in
recent times during one of the investigations into lobbying activities. A
senator approved of certain subpoenas which had demanded production
of all telegrams sent during a certain period "relating to the socalled
holding company bill"; he objected only to those which flatly demanded
all telegrams "relative to the subject matter under consideration," e.g.,
lobbying. But even on this point, the senator was rebuked by Senator
Norris, who, nevertheless, has always stood for the defense of the rights
of the citizen: "Where the Fourth Amendment is raised as an objection,
ought we not, while not nullifying the amendment, consider it in the
light of the fact that if we are very strict in our construction, the Fourth
Amendment might be used as an absolute barrier to the production of
evidence which every honest man would concede ought to be produced
and thus be used as a yoke instead of a protection to the innocent? It
might become the instrument of great injustice instead of protecting the
innocent.12117

The attitude of the courts towards the constant Congressional practice
has never been clearly proclaimed. In the case of an inquiry conducted by
213See 2 4 th
2"4

Cong. ist Sess. House. Rep. No.

193,

P.

2.

4oth Congr. 2d sess. Globe, 2580-I.

2's
44th Cong. 2d sess. Record 328. Ibid.: "The papers are required to be stated or specified
with only that degree of certainty which is practicable .......
2x6See, e.g., 44th Cong. 1st sess. Record 2008-2019. For a general appraisal of Congressional
practice in this respect, see Eberling, Congressional Investigations 286-7 (1928). Cf. also ibid.,
the interesting letter by Senator Walsh.
27 74th Cong. 2d sess. Record 4089-94.
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the Interstate Commerce Commission (whose investigative powers had at
times been more carefully watched by the Supreme Court than those of
Congressional committees), the application of narrow rules requiring a
"strict correspondence .... between allegation and proof" was rejected.21 8
On the other hand, a dictum took the view that the Fourth Amendment
does apply in such investigations, and that some "particularity" is demanded.219 More recently a subpoena ordering from the Western Union
Company all telegrams received or sent by a law firm during a period of
ten months was held unlawful ag interfering with the Fourth Amendment.220 It is doubtful whether this view would be upheld by the Supreme
Court of the United States. 221 It is likely that, in analogy to what has been
held in regard to testimonial evidence, no search for evidence will be
deemed "unreasonable" wherever an investigating committee has jurisdiction. 222 One of the most recent cases deciding the issue of Congressional
investigation shows clearly that the Supreme Court leaves unchallenged
most "inquisitorial" methods of search undertaken by Congressional committees.223

I.

EVIDENCE

iRom

ADmNsTRAToRs AND Or

iciA

Fnxs

The right to hear as witnesses not only private persons but administrative agents as well has always been claimed by the French parliament.224
For in the majority of cases control over the executive, one of the main
goals of political inquiry, can be exercised most efficiently by gathering
the facts from the administrators themselves.
Eminent constitutional writers have maintained in theory that the
duty of every civil servant to appear and testify to the best of his knowl218 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44 (1904).

"9 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76, 77 (19o6).
220 Strawn v. Western Union Telegraph Co., D.C. Sup. Ct., unreported, see 3 U.S. Law
Week 646 (1936); New York Times, March i2, z936, 1:4.
2 For a sound criticism of the decision, see 36 Col. L. Rev. 841 (1936).
-2

See Dimock, Congressional Investigating Committees 154 (1929).

223

Jumey v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 144 (1935); see supra at note 35. The committee

obtained evidence for its investigation as well as for the contempt proceeding against the
witness by the aid of inspectors of the Post Office Department, who searched through waste
and pasted together the bits of documents which had been tom to pieces by the client of the
witness. (See Sen. Doc. No. 162, 73 d Cong. 2d sess., zo6-ii6).
"4 See, e.g., the report of the Panama Committee, J. 0. Doc. Ch. 42 (1893): "The parliamentary committee is a delegation of the Chamber and it has always been recognized that it
was the duty of parliament to control the activities of the executive. While exercising those
functions, we have the right to put questions to you" (a high judicial official).
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edge before the committees resulted from the general relationship between
the executive and the supervising parliament.2 5
But since the days of the July Monarchy, the government has demanded the right to determine procedure in the hearings of officials before
parliamentary committees. The committee which in 1842 attempted to
investigate the illegal influence exerted by the administration upon certain electors at the polls informed various departments that it had decided to hear several civil servants as witnesses. The Minister of the
Interior protested against such a decision in the name of separation of
powers: the constitution had vested only the king with executive power.
While he, the minister, was willing to provide the committee with all
information concerning the activities of the administration, he would
never permit his subordinates to enter into direct contact with the parliament. Eventually a compromise solution was reached: the minister himself presented the administrators to the committee. "[Therewith] the
principle of the separation of powers and of responsibility will be observed.
....My presence will serve to mark the limits of the two powers. "- 6
Although it is not easy to understand what constitutional bearing the
presence of the Minister could possibly have had,227 the compromise
reached in 1842 determined the relations between investigating committees
and administration for almost a century to come.22' Not that the minister
was present at every hearing. But it was a settled rule that the committee
never established direct contact with the administrators; where they tried
to do so, strong protests were raised.229 The government, by circular letter
or by individual instruction, directed the officials as to what to say and
what not to say.230 According to the orders they had received, the wit22s
See, e.g., 4 Duguit, Trait6 de droit constitutionnel 396 (1924); and Manuel de droit
constitutionnel 457 (1g8).
,26See Moniteur Universel Suppl~rent to No. 117 (x843), April 27, 1843, 11-I1.
227 See also Arnitz, supra, note 17o atp. 69.
22A different procedure was adopted only in those emergency situations where extraordinary powers had been granted the committees. See supra, notes 18-21. The Committee
of 1848 had been granted the right to enter all government offices freely (see Michon, supra,
note 162, at p. r34). The committee investigating war supplies in 1871 obtained without delay
all official information and documents which it deemed necessary. See sessions of April 7, 1871,
J. 0. 446 (187z) and March 4, 1872, ibid. x565 (x872).
=9 See, e.g., the letter quoted by Pierre, supra, note 201, at p. 697, addressed on January
ig, 1888, by the Minister of the Interior in the name of the "good functioning of the administration" to a committee which had invited various officials to testify.
o30
For a curious and typical circular of the Minister of Justice in 1878, see ibid. 695: "Of
course the judiciary is interested in furthering the investigation ....
but ....
it also has
special duties of discretion and reserve ..... I For other circulars, see e.g., J. 0. 3-4, 51-52,
67 (1878).
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nesses sometimes took the oath, sometimes refused. Under oath they not
infrequently declared themselves unable to go beyond a certain point in
their testimony.21 On other occasions, a public official stated that al-

though the government had authorized him to testify freely, his own
conception of professional secrecy forbade him to lift the veil from administrative or judicial activities232

2 33
The parliamentary committees usually did not insist in such cases.

Certainly it would have been possible to set the mechanism of ministerial
responsibility into motion against the government.' But it then became a
question of political expediency whether it was advisable to overthrow
a government because it had not authorized a sub-prefect or an attorney
general to make a certain statement. There were, finally, some investigations for which the civil servants obtained full authorization to testify
without restraint.23

4

While Congress, in its investigations of the executive branch of government, had to reckon with some of the difficulties which the French parliament tried vainly to overcome, its record is on the whole far more successful. As early as 1792, three years after the Constitution went into effect,
the acting secretaries of the Treasury and War appeared before a Congressional committee inquiring into the causes of General St. Clair's expedition.23S In i818, the objection that an inquiry by the House into the

conduct of clerks in the executive department would be an infringement upon the executive's power was disregarded.236 In 1834 a committee
report assumed for Congress as the "great inquest of the Nation ....
power to inspect all departments of the Federal Government. '2 37 While it
was the rule to address the head of the department, this was by no means
always observed. In the many instances in which Congress directly
6 6

3,3
See the minutes of several committees related by Pierre, supra, note 2oi, at p. p 9 -7,

and Supp1ment 85 (1924).
232 An example is offered by the behavior of Attorney General Fabre in the first Rochette
investigation. See supra, at note 44.

233
See, e.g., the way in which the second Panama inquiry finally gave up the attempt to
hear the gravely compromised Attorney General Quesnay de Beaurepaire, who had refused to
testify, after lengthy animadversions against the committee's alleged violation of the separation of powers. J. 0. Doc. Ch. 41-42 (i898).
234 See, e.g., for the investigation concerning the events of February 6, z934, i Rapport
G6n6ral fait au nom de la commission d'enqute charg~e de rechercher les causes et les origines
des 6vnements du 6 f~vrier 1934. Annexes, No. 3383, P. 1345.
o
23s3 Annals of Congress (2d Cong.) 49 , zio6.
2363 Hinds' Precedents 85 (i9o7).

237 Ibid. 92.
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addressed another official, such as the military in the field, for instance,
no objection was raised on the part of the principals.231
The most marked differences between the situation prevailing in France
and that in the United States are to be found in the incomparably greater
number of investigations in this country calling for the appearance of
government officials, and in the very sweeping character of some of these
investigations, which sometimes called for scrutiny of the entire activities
of one or several departments.23 9 Almost all the resolutions urdering such
investigations granted the power to send for persons and papers. Numerous subpoenas were issued to government officials in each instance.240
As compared with the great number of these investigations, the conflicts which have arisen between executive and Congress have been
relatively infrequent-and have become more and more so241-however
violent the disputes might have been at times. From President Jackson's
refusal in 1837 to direct government officials to furnish certain information
(he swore to resist the requests made by Congress as he would resist "the
establishment of a Spanish inquisition")242 to President Coolidge's opposition in 1924 to the methods employed by the Senate investigating the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (he entered a "solemn protest" against what
he called "a government of lawlessness") 4 the struggle centered around
the perennial issue of parliamentary control versus administrative
efficiency. Very often when the government was reluctant to yield to
Congressional demands, it gave as a reason for its attitude the necessity of
238See,

e.g., the cases related ibid. i8g, 199.

239 The wide range of Congressional activity in this respect is demonstrated by the enumeration given by Eberling, supra, note 216, at p. 270-272 and by Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 4o Harv. L. Rev. 153, at 184-I92,
207 (1926). The question whether the frequency of such investigations is always an advantage
or is in part due to certain shortcomings of the American constitutional system (see Galloway,
The Investigative Function of Congress, 21 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. So, at 6o (1927)) cannot be
adequately dealt with here. See, however, infra, at notes 304 et seq.
240 See 6 Cannon's Precedents 596 (1935), and Eberling, supra, note 2x6, at p. 271.
24' During the period covered by McGeary, The Development of Congressional Investigative Power (i94o)-the ten years from the 71st to the 75 th Congress-in the course of
146 investigations not one executive officer refused to submit information to an investigating
committee. Ibid. 1o3, fn. 2o.
242 24 th Cong. 2d sess. Debates Vol. XIII, Appendix 202. Other parts of Jackson's explanation are very similar to the statement of the French Minister of Justice reported above at
note 230: "I shall on the one hand cause every facility consistent with law and justice to be
given at the investigation of specific charges; and, on the other, shall repudiate all attempts to
invade the just rights of the executive departments and of the individuals composing the same."
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68th Cong. ist sess. Record, 6o87.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

upholding the separation of powers. 44 Congress usually scolded the executive department for its refusal to comply with the requests of its
investigating committees in strong terms; sometimes proposals were
brought forward to have a government official arrested;.4 5 but when the
executive department chose to cling to its position, no action was taken
6
by either House.2
When the law of 1914 had been enacted in France, it was generally held
that it could be used also to enforce the complete testimony of civil
servants.2 47 As a matter of fact, the wording of the new law was broad
enough to include all groups of witnesses: it had indeed been enacted
especially to break down the reluctance of two high officials. But even
when it was being discussed by the Senate, and one senator expressed
concern about the possible encroachment of parliamentary inquiry upon
the realm of administration, his fears were appeased with the remark that

the new statute would by no means interfere with professional

8

secrecy.24

Actually the few committees to whom the rights of the law of 1914 were
49
granted never used them against officials.2
Whenever possible, the government tried to prevent an investigation
5
which could involve too dose an examination of administrative acts.2 0
244 See, e.g., President Buchanan, 3 6th Cong. ist sess., Globe, 1435, and President Coolidge
on the occasion mentioned in note 243. For a criticism of Coolidge's arguments, see Jenks, The
Control of Administration by Congress, 2 Am. Rev. 6oi (1924): "The theory of the legislative,
judicial and executive functions springs unfledged from his [Coolidge's] own creative intellect."
On the other hand, it has rightly been asserted by constitutional writers that frequent and
thorough investigations into the executive departments were necessary just because of the
relatively rigid separations of function under the American system. See Rogers, The American
Senate I9I-2r3 (1926), and Galloway, Investigation, Governmental, 8 Encyc. Soc. Sc. 256
(1937).
245 For

an incident occurring in x86o, see 3 Hinds' Precedents

24

(1907).

One of the most striking examples is offered by the conflict between President Jackson
and the House. Before abandoning its requests, the House had maintained that "the right to
ihvestigate abuses without full powers to procure information and evidence would present the
anomaly of the existence of a right without means of enforcing it." See ibid. x83; for another
instance, see ibid. i9i.
247 Bounard, supra, note 203, at p. 403, and Coustis de la Rivi~re, supra, note 203, at p.
37, 43.
248 See session of March 20, 1914, J. 0. D6bats Sen. 450 (1914).
246

249 Joseph-Barth616my and Duez, Trait6 de droit constitutionnel 55o (1933), explain that
generally only the discretion of the minister decides whether or not a civil servant testifies
before a committee (and whether or not administrative fles are communicated); the authors
maintain, however, that this situation changes when the competences of the 1914 statute are
granted an investigation. In practice such a difference did not exist in regard to civil servants.
Characteristically enough, the authors are not able to point to a single precedent which would
support their thesis.
2so Very typical was the discussion in the session of December 14, 1916, J. 0. D6bats Ch.
3665 (i916). The Minister of Finance most urgently recommended that no inquiry be started
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When an inquiry was unavoidable, the government continued to direct its
officials in their declarations before the parliamentary committees, even
when it authorized them to testify.
A contrasting attitude was taken on several occasions by high officials
in the United States when they themselves requested an investigation by
25
the House. '
As to the transmission of administrative files to the investigating committees, the situation in France was similar to that prevailing for the
hearing of officials. Only by invoking ministerial responsibility could a
reluctant government be forced to make the records available. Very often
the committees had to complain of that "admirable solidarity of the
ministries that induces the non-delivery of documents which are almost
5
always believed to be secret and confidential. 11
What in the French Republic seems to have been the rule is certainly
the exception in the United States. In 1886 the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary could state that "after a somewhat careful research .... there
is scarcely in the history of this Government until now any instance of a
refusal by a'head of a department, or even of the President himself, to
communicate official facts and information as distinguished from private
and unofficial papers.213 In one of the instances in which a subpoena
duces tecum had been issued in order to obtain official records from the
State of Louisiana, reluctant state officials were held in the custody of the
sergeant-at-arms for a month.2 4 What has been noted for the appearance
of government officials holds true as well for official documents: in
relatively few instances did conflicts that arose end in the failure of the
Senate or House to obtain the requested information.25 s It can therefore
which would gather evidence from public officials and documents for the purpose of cutting
down on spending not essential for the war. In this case the government was overruled. But
one of the deputies of the vanqulihed minority cried out in indignation, "You have reestablished the Convention!" To such an extent did it seem revolutionary to subject the government to a closer-than-usual scrutiny.
25ZSee, e.g., the request made in i8oo by the Secretary of the Treasury (6th Cong. 2d sess.,
Annals 786-8; by President Monroe in 1825 (18th Cong. 2d sess., Debates 170); in x826 by
Vice-President Calhoun (19 th Cong. 2d sess., Debates 574, 576). Other, similar cases are
mentioned by Galloway, supra, note 244, at p. 256. In more recent times, it is true, such requests for investigation have not been frequent.
252 J. 0. Documents Ch. 557 (1931).
253 4 9th Cong. ist sess. Record x585, et seq. For an impressive list of precedents on the
right to demand papers in the executive files, see 52d Cong. 2d sess., 7 Senate Misc. Doc. 366.
2S4 44 th Cong. 2d sess. Record 668, 2143.
SSS
See, for instance, the conflict between President Coolidge and the Senate, mentioned
above at note 243. While there is no instance in recent, times where documentary evidence
from official files was withheld from Congressional investigations (see above at note 241),
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be said that the situation was almost the reverse of that in France. While
there official documents "almost always" were believed secret and confidential, here they are almost always communicated to the Congressional
investigating committees.
The practices prevailing in Frawe undoubtedly did essentially hamper
the parliamentary effort to get to the true facts. Partly, information concerning administrative deeds was simply lacking. Partly, the facts could
not be seen "through parliamentary eyes"-an essential pre-condlition
of effective parliamentary investigation-but were colored by government and bureaucracy. Even an investigation which could draw upon the
maximum rights given by the law to parliamentary inquiries was unable
to drive a wedge into the wall behind which officialdom and administrative
secrecy hid.
The often-stressed fact that the actual powers in the Third Republic
belonged to the "triumphant bureaucracy," and that only seemingly had
the center of gravity in the governmental system shifted in the direction
of parliamentY s6 is thus confirmed by the situation in the field of parliamentary investigation.
It has been shown above that during the conflict of 1863-64 in Prussia
the very question as to what evidence could be gathered by an investigating committee from government officials and documents eventually
led to the breakdown of parliamentary inquiry.27 The government
reasoned that the right to enter directly into contact with the parliament
had always been denied to civil servants.25S While the parliamentary com-

mittee declared that "the government should be eager to further the
discovery of the truth," the Minister of the Interior saw in the requests
of the parliament only a violation of the separation of powers.2 5 9 For
McGeary, supra, note 241, at p. o3, fn. 20, mentions a fewi instances where the executive departments refused transmittal of records on a resolution of inquiry-another Congressional
technique of gathering information.
2s6 Very rightly, Franck, The Forces of Collaboration, 21 Foreign Affairs 44, at p. 45 (x942),
remarks that "the high civil bureaucracy had really become a caste, somewhat similar to the
Prussian Junkers." See also Sharp, The French Civil Service. Bureaucracy in Transition
c. 6 et seq. passim (ig3i). Erroneously, R. K. Gooch, Eugine Pierre, 41 Pol. Sci. Q. 438
(1926), believes in an actual shift of power toward the parliament. For the general problem
of the relation between parliament and the executive in post-war Europe, see Loewenstein,
The Balance between Legislative and Executive Power: A Study in Comparative Constitutional Law, 5 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 582-3 (1938).
257

See supra, at notes i4o and 141.

,S8 See von R6nne, supra, note 132, at p. 294.
259

Haus der Abgeordneten. Session of January 25, z864.

2

Stenographische Berichte 938-9.

DUTY OF DISCLOSURE IN PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATION

i4i

similar considerations, the government refused also to bring to the knowl6
edge of the committee the official files it had requested.2 o
In later years, although the parliamentary inquiry was no longer
practiced, the Prussian government maintained that any contact between
parliamentary commissions and the administration was possibly solely
when established by the government itself.261 When one of the vain
attempts was made to introduce the right of parliamentary inquiry into
the constitution of the German Reich, a liberal deputy who opposed the
bill stated that it would endanger the authority of the administrative
hierarchy if the parliament could address a subordinate directly.26
With the introduction of Article 34 of the Weimar Constitution, the
question arose whether Section 54 should be included among the provisions of the Code of Penal Procedure to be applied to parliamentary'
commissions. This section provides that where the duty of official
secrecy was involved, civil servants could testify only with the authorization of their hierarchical superiors. As it was generally doubtful as to
which questions involved official secrecy, practically no government
official testified before the courts without the authorization of his principals. According to the code, this authorization could be withheld only
when harm to the state could arise from the testimony. However, the
decision as to what was to be considered harmful was entirely in the discretion of the administration, and could be challenged only by complaint
6
to those of higher rank. 3

As it was the very aim of political inquiry to secure an efficient control
by the parliament over the executive, it should have been regarded as nonsensical to maintain the full extent of official secrecy with the aid of a Code
'
article whose application could hardly be regarded as "appropriate. 2

6

4

But by the majority of writers, as well as in practice, it was not doubted
that a civil servant testifying before a parliamentary investigating committee had to obtain the authorization of his superior2 65
Bericht der XII Kommission, etc. (see note 138) 10-12.
von Bitter, x Handw6rterbuch der preussischen Verwaltung 939 (i9o6).
262Session of June 5,1868, i Stenographische Berichte fiber die Verhandlungen des Norddeutschen Bundes 259 (i868).
263
See L6we-Rosenberg, Die Strafprozessordnung fdir das deutsche Reich z65-7 (1925).
264 See Finger, supra, note i69, at p. 262. Alsberg, 34.1 J.T. 378-9, rightly points out that
strict adherence to the principle of official secrecy would forbid parliamentary inquiry to play
the role which the father of the institution, Max Weber, had assigned to it.
26sSee Heck, supra, note 152, at p. 59; Stier-Somlo, in 6 Handw6rterbuch der Rechtswissenschaft 287 (1929); Jacobi, 34.2 J. T. 99; Alsberg, 34.1 J.T. 343. In pre-republican times a
writer, though in favor of an effective investigation, had maintained that, even as before the
26o
I

261 See
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The inquiry committees which wished to hear a public official had no
66
rightful claim for the granting of an authorization to testify2 In most
cases, however, the authorization was obtained because the parliament
was able to resort to ministerial responsibility.267 When compared with
the situation in France, the stronger party discipline which prevailed in
the German Republic seems to have allowed for a somewhat greater
penetration of parliamentary investigations into the realm of adminis6
trative secrecy.21
Nevertheless, the way in which the hearing of government officials
was practiced in republican Germany left a wide field still untouched by
parliamentary investigation. Certain matters, such as all questions pertaining to foreign policy or military life, were simply taboo. The committees usually refrained from even requesting the appearance of officials
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. Very
often committees and administration alike avoided the introduction of
evidence in matters which would have brought the bureaucratic apparatus
as such into the limelight of public discussion. In other cases in which
the committees wanted to elucidate the facts, authorization to testify
was flatly denied; the parliament judged it politically inopportune, how5
ever, to fight the issue to the end.2
9
A certain differentiation in the treatment of departments to be investigated has also been observed in the United States. While the Senate addresses the heads of all departments with direct requests for transmittal of
papers and records, such requests are "as a matter of courtesy" never extended to the Secretary of State.270 Moreover, it is customary, whenever an
investigating committee wants to obtain information from the President
or the Secretary of State, to ask for it with the additional clause "if not
incompatible with the public interest." This formula, which invites the
courts, a civil servant would usually not testify about matters where official secrecy was involved; such testimony could not be expected during a proceeding such as a parliamentary investigation, where the common interest in truth discovery was not equally strong. See Zweig,
supra, note I35, at p. 323.
266 This had been explicitly stated before the Prussian Staatsbank-Committee, 6 Drucksachen des Preuss. Landtags. 2 Wahlperiode 1925 Sitzung No. 1222, 2565.
26 See Alsberg, supra, note 264, at p. 379, who stresses the fact that in this matter open
conflicts such as occurred in France had been avoided in Germany.
268 To this point see, also, Heck, supra, note 152, at p. 6r.
269 See 9 Drucksachen des Preuss. Landtags. 2 Wahlperiode 1925 No. 3345, 75i; and
Jacobi, supra, note 265, at p. 99.
270

Speaker Spooner, on January 23, i9o6. See 3 Hinds' Precedents i98 (i9o7).
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executive to exercise discretion, is usually not observed with other departments.271

Even where the authorization was granted in Germany, the statement
delivered by the testifying officials had previously been discussed with
their hierarchical superiors in every detail. Never did the witnesses depart
from the instructions given them, even when the committee wished to go
beyond that limit. The result was not only that such statements did not
always exactly further the discovery of the "truth." Even more important was the fact that by such practices, exactly as in France, parliamentary investigation did not meet the administrative reality face to face.
It could never gather the facts at the source, but was always presented
with a picture drawn by the central authorities.
It has been suggested that the distinctly sporadic character of parliamentary investigations and the fact that the inquiries never developed into
a significant feature of Weimar democracy, reflected the confidence of the
parliament in the integrity and efficiency of the executive and jucidial
branches of government.2

72

In view of the foregoing, it means, rather,

that the bureaucratic traditions of Germany and Prussia had, all through
the years of the German Republic, been strong enough to prevent parliamentary investigation from becoming an efficient weapon of legislative
control and a sweeping means of fact discovery.
The question of the extent to which the government was obliged to
make official files and papers available to the inquiry committees was
equally controversial,' 73 in spite of the broad wording of the constitutional provisions as to this point. In practice as well, conflicts
sometimes arose over the question of official records. While in general
the government and the administration complied with the requests of a
'7 6 Cannon's Precedents 604 (1935); also 3 Hinds' Precedents x87, 193 (19o7). For a
situation in which President Hoover refused to communicate documents concerning the

London naval treaties because to do so would violate an "invariable practice of nations," see 6
Cannon's Precedents 596. It seems, however, that sometimes the "if not incompatible .... "

form is employed also for other departments. See, e.g., for the Treasury, 6 Cannon's Prece-

dents 584-587. (In one of the cases mentioned, the Secretary's answer was that he did deem
the communication incompatible with the public interest.)
272

Morstein-Marx, supra, note 52, atp. 1141.

For a discretionary decision of the government concerning the transmission of records,
see Lammers, supra, note 129, at p. 473; Poetzsch-Heffter, Handkommentar zur Reichsverfassung 183-84 (3d ed. i928). For an unlimited right to require the files: Hatschek, supra,
note 132, Vol. i, 698; Anschfitz, supra, note i89, at p. I4o; Heck, supra, note 152, at p. 68;
Alsberg, 42.1 J. T. 346. K611reutter, supra, note 184 at p. 257, thought that in some states
with particularly great political tension, it would be suicidal for the government to give administrative and judicial files into the hands of a party fundamentally hostile to the existing
state such as the National Socialists.
273
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parliamentary committee to inspect the files, such requests were sometimes denied.74 When the reform of the parliamentary inquiry was discussed in 1926, a judge, who was also the chairman of important inquiry
committees, declared that it was necessary to give the committees greater
access to the files. 7 5- A special difficulty arose from the fact that it was

not considered a duty of the authorities of the Reich or of the states to
comply with
requests made by a committee of one of the other German
6
States.27

In the United States it has sometimes been regretted that the courts
have never passed explicitly on the unsettled question of how far Congress
can go in obtaining information from the executive branch of the government.2 77 Certainly here also the absence of judicial decisions results from
the fact that so few conflicts actually arose. While in the case of testimony of private citizens the conflicting interests clashed at least sometimes, differences between the legislature and the executive were settled
by the retreat of one of them.
Furthermore the reluctance of either branch of government to bring
their dissensions before the judicial department certainly contributed to
the reaching of a compromise solution each time a conflict came up. The
question might hardly be regarded as a judicable one. The balance between the need for administrative efficiency (which might sometimes require a certain amount of secrecy) and the ardor of parliment to supervise
through investigation, will always be unstable. It has to be sought anew
with every changing of a variously determined situation.27 8 From a comparison of the results obtained in the United States on the one hand, and
France and Germany on the other, it seems, however, that where the
legislature can rely on powerful investigating powers developed by
parliamentary precedent, this balance is more easily and more happily
established.
Rather often it proved a special handicap for the discovery of the
truth that the same facts which were being investigated by a parliamentary committee were also the object of court proceedings. The very
274 See i Drucksachen des Preuss. Landtags. 2 Wahlperiode 1925 No. 248, 295.
27s
Schetter, 34.2 J. T. 141.
276 See

2 Drucksachen des Preuss. Landtags. 2 Wahlperiode 1925 No. 580,

1383.

277 See Dimock, supra, note 222. at p. 27-8. See also McGeary, supra, note 241, at p. 102.
'The wide formula by which the decision in the McGrain v. Daugherty case delimited legiti-

mate investigation (see supra, text after note 1i) includes all investigations into the various
branches of the executive departments.
278 For the general problem of investigation into the executive branch, especially of city and
state government, see 42 Col. L. R. 1217, et seq. (1942).
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nature of political inquiries, dealing very frequently with collusion between the political and financial spheres, explains that the majority of
facts investigated were also brought before the courts. In theory it has
always been recognized that political inquiry and criminal proceedings
were organized for different ends and therefore did not interfere with
each other even when investigating the same facts. 279 Practically, how-

ever, both in France and in Germany the investigating powers of parliamentary committees were challenged and often narrowed down whenever
the courts opened simultaneous proceedings.
In France the parliament was sometimes invited by the government to
adjourn its investigation until simultaneous criminal proceedings were
terminated. It happened that the parliament complied with the government's suggestion, shy as it was of committing what was usually represented as a violation of the separation of powers.210 When simultaneous
proceedings were launched, the committees were frequently faced with the
refusal of the courts to communicate their files.21 The judiciary thereby

had the possibility of depriving the parliament of most essential elements
of evidence. It had indeed been asserted that in some instances the
government provoked the opening of criminal proceedings with the very
intention of confining the investigation to the courts and rendering the
inquiry by the parliament impracticable.212 The latter then had only
279 See, for France: Michon, supra, note 162, at p. go; Duguit, supra, note 225, VoL 4, 394;
for Germany: Kammergericht, March I9,192o, quoted above at note 183; W. Rosenberg,
Parlamentarische und Gerichtliche Untersuchung, in 3o Deutsche Juristen Zeitung 630 (1925);
Lewald, supra, note i5g, at p. 314. Joseph-Barth6l6my, Essai sur le travail parlementaire et le
systme des commissions 251 (1934), does not deny that the simultaneousness of inquiry and
court proceeding is perfectly legal, but he finds such a situation nonetheless "shocking."
280 See, e.g., the session of the Chamber on May ig, i913, J. 0. D6bats Ch. 1458-6o. The
parliament reserved the right to open an inquiry after the closing of the criminal proceedings.
Actually the investigation was never started. That the issue of the separation of powers was
wrongly raised in such instances is recognized by Michon, supra, note 162, at p. 117. For
other conflicts between the Chamber and the government on the subject of simultaneous
criminal proceedings, see Pierre, Suppl6ment 799-800 (1924).

291The committees saw themselves denied knowledge of the files while the matter was still
pending before the courts, as well as when the proceedings were dropped after an investigation.
An instance of the latter kind is offered by the refusal to submit the court files concerning the
Bonapartist propaganda in 1874-5. The chairman of the parliamentary committee stated that
the inquiry was unable to fulfill the mission assigned to it. See session of February 26, x875,
J. 0. D6bats Ch. 1482 (1875). The motive invoked by the recalcitrant Attorney General was
again the separation of powers. See Michon, supra, note 162, at p. Iog. In cases of still pending
court proceedings, the refusal was sometimes motivated with Article 38 of the law of July 29,
1881, concerning the publication of the contents of criminal files by the press. About the
fallaciousness of such argumentation, see Duguit, supra, note 225, Vol. 4, 395.
282The Viscomte de Villebois-Mareuil, in the session of the Chamber on July ir, i9IO,J. 0.

D~bats Ch.

2500

(igro).
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the possibility of denying to the government a vote of confidence.213 But
as this was not always politically wise, the committee was on several
occasions satisfied if the Minister of Justice made at least part of the files
available.284 Although in other cases the entire files were handed over to
the committees,2 85 there can be no doubt that the competition between
courts and committees for the discovery of the truth resulted in an actual
and often essential deterioration of the results of parliamentary investigation.
In the German republic, attacks against the right of inquiry were motivated mostly by the alleged evils of simultaneous parliamentary investigations and court proceedings. In 1925 the bi-annual meeting of the
association of German judges made the subject of political inquiry committees the central problem of its debates. One of the judges called the
simultaneousness of both types of investigation a "danger for criminal proceedings at large .... a monstrous collusion. ' ' 2S6 Another declared, to the
sound of applause, that the pblitical inquiry committees had become a
"first-class scandal ....a sabotage of the law," and called for the fight
against the "new parliamentary tyrannical justice. ' ' 2 87 Both these speakers placed themselves in the category of liberals. In a motion carried by a
great majority, the convention asserted that parliamentary investigations
of facts subject to court proceedings did not further the discovery of the
28
truth but actually hampered it.
The same complaints were voiced from the tribune of the Reichstag,
where parliamentary investigations were considered a "danger for the
regular course of law.' ' 2S9 A bill was brought forward in the Reichstag
2s See session of February 26, 1875, J. 0. D6bats Ch. 1482-83 (1875), and session of
November 28, 1892, ibid. 1742 (1892); also Pierre, supra, note 201, at p. 7o4. For a complete
account of the controversies between courts and committees during the Panama investigations, see Coumoul, Trait6 du pouvoir judiciaire. De son r6le constitutionnel et de sa r6forme
organique 232, 235, 241 (1911).
284 See a letter addressed by the Minister of Justice, Barthou, to Jaur~s on July i9,191o,
published by Pierre, supra, note 201, Suppl6ment 8oi (1924). For a conflict during the Oustric
investigation which was later partially overcome, see Le Temps, January 7, 1931.
28SSee, e.g., the so-called Humbert inquiry, quoted by Pierre, supra, note 201. Supplement
798 (1924).
86

' Wunderlich, Die Stellung des Deutschen Richters (Referat auf dem Sechsten Deutschen Richtertag in Augsburg, September I925). 17 Deutsche Richterzeitung Beilage, 25
(1925).
297 Mueller-Meiningen, ibid. 44, and the same, Was dem Deutschen Richter nottut, 30
Deutsche Juristen Zeitung 531, et seq. (1925).
288 17 Deutsche Richterzeitung 478 (1925).

289See session of February i6, 1926, 389 Verhandlungen III Wahiperiode 5602. Similarly
November 9, 1926, 391 ibid. 7987 C, and March i, 1925 384 ibid. ioi A.
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which aimed, by a modification of Article 34, at the suspension of every
kind of parliamentary investigation while criminal proceedings covering
the same facts were pending.290 Had this bill been passed, the parliamentary inquiry in the large majority of cases would have been rendered
impossible, or at least futile. One of the fundamental rights of parliament would have been lost before the suspension of the Weimar- Constitution in 1933.

The Pennsylvania legislature recently endeavored to enact a statute
which would have had an exactly contrary effect. It wanted to make it
the duty of courts to suspend grand jury investigation of misdemeanors
in public office until after the House of Representatives of Pennsylvania,
if it chose to investigate the charges, should have completed its investigation. Although this statute was held unconstitutional291 it is characteristic
that in Germany a bill was brought forward to assure the predominance
of court proceedings, while the Pennsylvania statute aimed to secure an
effective parliamentary investigation.
OF PARIAIIIENTARY INVESTIGATIONS-CONcLUSIONS
However great the differences in the development of parliamentary investigation in the various countries have been, at times almost identical
complaints of disappointing results have been voiced in the United States
and in France.
Woodrow Wilson spoke of the "irksome, ungracious investigations"
and their "spasmodic endeavors" affording a mere "glimpse of the inside
of a small province of federal administration. 292 By others, Congressional investigations were called "fruitless of results of permanent
value" ;293 the "little that these investigations yield" does not make "blind
IV. THE RESULTS

and incestuous" Congressional opinion clear-sighted.294 Investigations by

Congress were also castigated as a "gossip broadcasting station, a scaven290 March ii, 1926, 407 Verhandlungen des Reichstag, III Wahlperiode 1924, Anlagen zu
dem Stenographischen Berichte No. 2o5o. A similar move was recommended by Stier Somlo,
Ein Gruss dem 34. Deutschen Juristentag, 55 Juristische Wochenschrift 214 (1926), and by
0tker, Untersuchung durch einen Reichstagsausschuss wifhrend schwebenden Strafverfahrens,
91 Der Gerichtssaal 428, et seq. (1925).
291Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings (No. 2) 332 Pa. 342 (1938).
The court held that both jury and legislative investigations are proper and must be carried
out simultaneously if they happen to coincide in time. The hope was expressed that the
officials of both legislature and court would be mindful of their public responsibility and carry
on these simultaneous inquiries in a spirit of mutual cooperation.
292 Congressional Government 271 (1925 ed.).
293Ford,
294

Representative Government 224 (1924).
Lippmann, Public Opinion 290, 288 (1922).
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ger of the private drains responsible for public malady.' '19 When the
opening of a new investigation into lobbying activities was being discussed in the Senate, a Senator indignantly remarked, "I say that in my
opinion 95 per cent of these investigations are absolutely worthless and
nothing has been accomplished by them. ' ' 2 96 A diligent student of both
American and French political institutions maintained that Congressional
investigations compare unfavorably in speedy efficiency even with in97
quiries of the French Chamber.2
In France, as early as 19o9, a deputy declared himself unable to vote
for an inquiry committee because for twenty years he had been witnessing
the failure of too many investigations. X t the opening of every investigation, he said, hopes were evoked that finally an end would be brought to
scandals, incompetencies and waste; but each time, in spite of the good
will of the committee members, the investigations collapsed, therewith increasing the general disappointment.29 8 Twenty years later, Tardieu, at
one time the most intelligent critic of French parliamentarism, mockingly
spoke of many a fruitless investigation, and added that frequently "as
far as the discovery of the truth is concerned, the committees when they
disband cannot boast of results equal to those they expected when they
started their investigations."' 99 In 1934 a high official of the Ministry of
Justice was reported to have said to a witness who was to appear before
an inquiry committee, "Do you really still pay attention to parliamentary
investigations? That's all vanished with yesteryear's snows. 30 0 The
"sterilityof the parliamentary inquiries was attested," 30' the disappointing
results evidenced by the committee reports generally conceded.302 The
295Jenks, supra, note 244, at 599.
296 74th Cong. ist sess., Record 6339.
297 Sharp, The Government of the French Republic 3o3 (1938). Professor Sharp sees his
contention evidenced by the fact that it took much longer to detect and drive from office the
"Ohio gang" under the I-arding administration than it did to remove an entire government"
some members of which had been only slightly involved in the Stavinsky affair. It seems to the
writer that these undeniable differences are due to the fact that in France k simple vote of the
majority compels the government to resign. As a matter of fact the Chautemps government
had tp go before the parliamentary investigation started.
298 Gauthier de Clagny in the session of March 25, i9o9, J. 0, Dtbats Ch. 854 (r9o9).
"There is but one remedy," a deputy interrupted the speaker, "the revision of the constitution." He did not elaborate, however, as to what revision he deemed necessary.
299 Session of November 21, 1930, J. 0. D6bats Ch. 3529 (1930).
300

Session of February 16, 1934, ibid. 489 (1934).

301

By Barth~l~my, supra note So, at 250.

302 See Arnitz, supra, note 17o, at p. 6 and 259; Michon, supra, note 162, at p. 16o. Very
often the final report on the investigation was published only in part or not at all. See, e.g., for
the Oustric scandal, J. 0. Doc. Ch. No. 4756, p. 550 (i931) and 702 (1932); for the investigation
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more optimistic note struck by the report on the Stavisky investigation,
praising the "undeniable usefulness" of investigation and dismissing the
attacks against the institution as unsubstantiated, remained an exception.3o3
But this similarity of language should not induce us to think that the
evils complained of or the reasons for disappointing results are identical
in the various countries under discussion. The very frequency of Congressional investigations might be responsible to a certain extent for the
disappointing results complained of. While it is hardly justified to maintain that investigation should be nothing but a "last resort" means of obtaining information,304 it must be admitted that it is possible to deviseoutside of the often clumsy, tedious, and slow process of investigationsatisfactory means of observing and correcting the executive,1°5 and of
gathering material for reformatory legislationo

6

But there will always

be a wide range of questions for which the investigating process with its
extensive hearings and its sifting of evidence will prove indispensable.
Certainly "government by investigation is not government, ' ' 30 but
government without investigation might easily turn out to be democratic
government no longer. Where democratic process is maintained, it will
always be the role of the minority to reveal whatever shortcomings and
into the elections of 1924, ibid. Annexe No. 2098 (1925).-The belatedness of the committee
reports also had to be considered as jeopardizing the usefulness of Congressional investigations.
See Galloway, supra, note 239, at p. 66.
33 See, however, Rapport Lafont 5.It is true that the Stavisky inquiry, as well as the
investigation into the events of February 1934 had, owing to the political situation, obtained
somewhat better results than the others.
304 This opinion is expressed by Dinock, supra, note 221, at p. 26. Quite to the contrary,
Senator Nye, after the many investigations in which he had participated, asserted that "we
should have not less, but more legislative investigations." See his radio address of May 23,
1933, printed in 73 d Cong. ist sess., Record 4182-3.
30sSee Luce, Legislative Procedure, 174 (1922); Galloway, supra, note 244, at p. 257. It
has often been complained that under the American constitutional system legislative and
executive almost never meet face to face, and that therefore the former is often at a loss to
secure the necessary information without resorting to investigation. See Wilson, Congressional Government 271 (1925 ed.); Rogers, supra, note 244, at p. 196. The contention that
Congress fares less well in regard to obtaining information than do the European legislatures
is opposed by Willoughby, Principles of Legislative Organization and Administration 176
(1934).

306
To discuss the possible alternatives to legislative investigation in certain cases is outside
the scope of this paper. See, for a comprehensive enumeration, McGeary, supra, note 241, at
p. 12 1-14o, and Galloway, supra, note 244, at p. 252, 257.
307This was uttered by Secretary of the Treasury Mellon, during the Senate's investigation
into the practices of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (see supra, note 243), 68th Cong. ist sess.,
Record 6o98.
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failures of the majority in power are believed to exist; in order to verify
such a belief, investigatory proceedings must be resorted to.
It has sometimes been said that the partisan spirit characteristic of
such investigations diminishes considerably the value of the committee
findings. It is true that at the bottom of most inquiries is found, not a
Faustian striving for perfection, but the desire of one party to discredit its
competitors as much as possible by fastening upon them some political
scandal. This frequently turns the investigations into "fishing expeditions," collecting material for electioneering purposes, pushing inquiries
into realms which lie far outside the limits of the avowed legislative aim,
and neglecting the collection of evidence which might provide essential
information but which would be useless against the political adversary.
That procedures led in such a spirit and with such methods are frequently
far from serving the disclosure of the truth has been an oft-heard complaint. It is also true that public opinion faces frequent investigations of
this kind with increasing bewilderment and that their findings, usually
divided on party lines, command but little respect and make the public
weary of reiterated scandals.30
Now, it is not necessarily true that an investigation cqnducted for
partisan purposes cannot further the discovery of the truth. While that
end may be only incidental for some of the committee members, such
investigations also bring to the surface pertinent facts which would otherwise be hidden. If sheer animosity and exicted partisanship lead the investigators, the searchlights they turn on persons and events under investigation might often provide a distorted picture which must be corrected before the taking of proper decision.309 But they still shed light in
corners which otherwise would escape every scrutiny.3o
308 Jenks, supra, note 244, at p. 599-600; Dimock, supra, note 222, at p. 164; Ford, supra,
note 293, at p. 224. See also Wigmore, ig Ill. L. Rev. 452 at 453 (1925), speaking about the investigations of 1923-24:, "The Senate .... fell rather in popular estimate to the level of professional searchers of the municipal dunghills."
309 The criticism aroused by the so-called "un-American activities" investigations certainly
merits special attention. See, e.g., Cushman, Safeguarding Our Civil Liberties 6-8 (i94o),
and Legislative Investigations, International Juridical Association Monthly Bulletin 73,
78-84 (1941) (evidently this article has never been concluded). But although the aims and

methods of this type of investigation were under attack, this did not lead to a call for the
curtailment of investigating activities and powers in general.
310It is characteristic that in France, where the results of investigation were particularly
poor, the esprit de corps embracing almost all parliamentarians (see supra, note 184) often
prevented the investigators from indulging too much in sharp "partisan spirit." See for a
typical remark to that effect the report in the Snia-Viscosa affair, J. 0. Doc. Ch. 551 (1931).
In the United States it might not be impossible to correct some of the alleged "evils" of
partisan investigation by the self-imposed adoption of certain procedural restraints. For some
proposals which might prove valuable, see Morstein-Marx, supra note 152, at p. i143.
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It must be maintained, therefore, that in spite of the criticism which has
sometimes been voiced, Congressional investigation does have positive
results which were never obtained either in France or in Germany. Partly
these results have not been perceived because their effect does not emerge
into the open at all, or is neither direct nor immediate.1r Their preventive
function is altogether immeasurable: the Damoclean sword of an impending investigation will often enough prove a sufficient deterrent from
wrongdoing, should the natural impulses of an honest administration become weakened. The role which investigation has played and will play in
shaping public opinion can hardly be overestimated and will always be
most valuable for preparing new legislation.312 Finally, there have been
important instances which show that sometimes by nothing short of an
effective investigation can the overhauling of a defective administrative
machinery be accomplished, whether the inquiry results in the removal
of unworthy administrators from office 313 or in the rescuing of large public
funds.
It would be impossible to cite for parliamentary inquiries organized
under the German or the French Republic such immediate effects as were
obtained-to cite only some of the more recent investigations-in the cases
of Teapot Dome, the Daugherty brothers, the Continental Trading Co.,
34
and the securities and banking investigations. y
The unsatisfactory results in both France and Germany 315 can easily be
at p. 178.
good illustration of this point is provided by the following excerpt from the hearings
which took place during the Fletcher inquiry into the stock exchanges and banking, quoted
from Pecora, Wall Street under Oath x86-7 (939): Sen. Cousens: "So public opinion does
have some effect upon Wall Street." Mr. Wiggins [of the Chase National Bank]: "I think it
has a pretty good effect." .... Sen. Cousens: "Then these hearings are a good thing, aren't
they?" Mr. Wiggins: "I hope so, Senator." Mr. Pecora: "Do you think they educate public
opinion with respect to the existence of certain evils in banking and stock market circles?"
Mr. Wiggins: "I hope so."
-2 See McGeary, supra, note 241, at p. 85; Willoughby, supra, note 305,

312A

313 Rogers, supra, note 244, at p. 207, speaking of the consequences of the 1924 investi-

gations: "It is sufficient to remark that three out of ten cabinet members were permitted or
pressed to resign; that there were several indictments and two suicides."
3r4 The enumeration is taken from Senator Nye's speech, quoted supra, note 304. The
speech then went on to summarize forcefully the benefits of investigation: "They afford
necessary knowledge basic to helpful legislation. They educate people to practices unfriendly
to their best interest. They throw fear into men and interests who would by any means at their
command move governments to selfish purposes. They command respect for government and
for law. They tend to make government cleaner and more responsive to public needs and
interests." Compare with such statements the remarks of French parliamentarians, supra
passim, who always lamented about what the inquiries had been unable to achieve.
31S While the results in Germany during the relatively short period in which parliamentary
inquiry was actually practiced were somewhat more favorable than in France, they by no
means corresponded to the hopes pinned on the new institution before the enactment of the
constitutional provision. What the investigations actually achieved in terms of unveiling facts
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explained by the insufficient powers obtained by the parliamentary committees. Investigations which were barred from the cognizance of pertinent facts by the reluctance of witnesses or of the executive were bound
to lead nowhere. Committees which, in their efforts to discover the truth,
were almost certain to be rebuked by the courts on whose aid they had to
rely were anxious to avoid any conflict and thus, in their search for evidence, did not even go to the limits of their competences. Moreover, a
procedure which was helpless against a witness who chose to insult the
investigating committee hardly increased respect for parliamentary institutions, and therefore could not be relied upon to strengthen popular
6
belief in effective democratic government. '
On the other hand, Congressional investigations, also struggling very
often against powerful odds,317 could never have fumlled the various tasks
assigned to them, and would never have been able to obtain the knowledge underlying their final findings, had they not been endowed with the
means of discovery afforded by the common law contempt powers, by the
strength of parliamentary precedents, or by statutory provisions. Public
opinion in the United States always backed the exercise of investigatory,
-indeed inquisitorial, powers. Most people were indignant when in 1924
Daugherty refused to answer, when Sinclair defied the investigating committee, and when Stewart attempted to follow suit.Y'5 And even writers
who deplore those intrusions into the private sphere, which are accepted
as a matter of course before the "bar of public opinion,"39 do not often
recommend an essential curtailment of the Congressional powers, and
always reject the idea of discontinuing investigations altogether. - 2°
was far from satisfactory. The results they sometimes yielded have been described to the
writer by personalities closely connected with parliamentary activity in the Weimar period as
ephemeral at best. See also Morstein-Marx, supra, note 154, at p. 1143.
316 Under these conditions, it was deemed wise not to make parliamentary investigation too
permanent a feature of constitutional life. Hence the sporadic character of the institution in
Germany and France, especially when compared with the frequency of Congressional investigation. See Dinock, supra, note 222, at p. 44; Bdhmert, supra, note 178, at p. i;
Morstein-Marx, supra, note 154, at p. 1141.
317See Frankfurter, Hands off the Investigations, 38 New Republic 329 (1924), stressing
that in spite of those odds some of the investigations revealed "wrong-doing, incompetence
and low public standards" in surprisingly little time.
318 McBain, Congress, Inquiries and the Constitution, New York Times, March I, 1928,
IX 6: r-8.
319See Judge

Cochran in Ex parte Daugherty, 299 Fed. 620, 639 (S.D. Ohio, W.D. 1924).
3"0 Jenks (compare supra, notes 295,308) calls, at 599, investigations a "natural remedy for
an otherwise intolerable condition"; among the improvements he proposes, none deals with a
diminution of investigating powers. "For the time being," he concludes, "Congressional investigation must be as unimpaired as its qualities will permit." Flynn, Senate Inquisitors and
Private Rights, i61 Harper's 362 (i93o), does not "want to decry the practice of Congressional
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The situation in France and Germany was totally different. Not only
where outright political issues were involved, as in the case of the Hidenburg-Ludendorff hearings, but almost always, the refusal, in the name of
the right to privacy and secrecy, to disclose the true facts was upheld.
Even the most impudent lies and the most alarming scandals were unable
so to swing public opinion that it might force a strengthening of powers
which, from the outset, had been much weaker than those obtained in the
United States and England.
In France, courts and attorneys general bowed before witnesses who had
affronted an investigating committee; constitutional writers did not shrink
from elaborating spurious arguments to prove the righteousness of rebels;
senators and deputies competed in warning against the dangers with
which efficient inquiries threatened civil liberties. The republican Reichstag and the German Constitutional Court endeavored to narrow the
scope and power of investigations. The administration of neither democracy tolerated the inspection of the legislature. The electorate remained
unmoved and passive.
For Congress an investigation vested with adequate powers has always
been so much identified with good government that its majority never
scrupled, when need was, to tear down the barriers which the Bill of Rights
set up against inquisitorial scrutiny. Courts steadily abandoned previous
attempts to restrain Congressional investigation, and left wide open the
gates to the realm of privacy.
When, after the war, thought will again be given to the problem of reconciling efficiency of government with freedom of individuals, it might
well be remembered that to provide the organs of control with effective
means of obtaining indispensable information is one of the prerequisites
of a responsible government. 32' The European experience shows conclusively that where facts can be ascertained only by a curtailment of the
citizen's individual freedom there should be no hesitation in paying that
price, lest the freedom of all be endangered.
investigations. Many important and far-reaching reforms have been achieved through them."
Lippmann (compare supra, note 294, at 288, 290, and supra, note 39, at 132) wishes neither to
abolish the committees nor to submit to them. He requests that over "this conflict of interests"
there shall preside "a vigilant, disinterested public opinion." But so far as public opinion has
taken an interest in investigations, it has mostly striven for strong inquisitorial powers.
Rogers, supra, note 244, at p. 2o6 remarks, after having been very critical of certain investigations: "If alternatives are no inquiry at all or an inquiry that is abused, then the choice must
be for the latter."
32,
Although perfectionist devices of constitutional law alone will never prove to be a
sufficient guarantee against tyranny, this lesson might be of special importance in so many
European countries where the vicious circle leading from despotism to ardent republicanism
and back to dictatorship must be broken.

